Decision Points
President Bush’s 2010 memoir, Decision Points, is essential reading for anyone who wishes to understand the key decisions which occurred during his two terms in office. Mr. Bush’s style is clear, direct, easy to read, and he adds a touch of humor. I found Decision Points both enjoyable and enlightening. I had forgotten how many significant events occurred during Mr. Bush’s presidency. Given my Iraq deployments, I was most interested in his decisions relating to the war in Iraq.
I was in Quantico teaching new Marine officers on 9/11. We all understood the world had changed. We were at war, and we expected it would not be long before the Marine Corps got into the fight. In the meantime, as instructors, all we could do was prepare lieutenants to the best of our ability and wait until we were sent back to the operating forces. From our distant perspective, it seemed like everything was going well in Afghanistan. The Taliban had been deposed and a new Afghan government was taking shape. We seemed to have missed our chance.
Then came rumblings of war against Iraq. In late 2002 and early 2003, U. S. rhetoric heated up and more U. S. troops were sent to Kuwait. In Quantico, we were little more than spectators, but we were generally supportive. We wanted a chance to strike at those we believed threatened the security of the United States.
In early 2003, as war in Iraq appeared more likely, General Tony Zinni spoke at Quantico. His remarks focused on Afghanistan and Iraq. He was concerned we were taking our eye off the ball in Afghanistan and stretching our forces too thin. He said, “I’m a one war at a time kind of guy.” This struck a chord with me and I am ashamed to say it was not something I had given much thought before General Zinni mentioned it. The United States could decide when to go to war in Iraq; why choose to do so when all our attention ought to be focused on Afghanistan? Zinni felt we were steering toward war in Iraq and he was troubled there was no meaningful Congressional debate. In Decision Points, President Bush articulated his reasoning and the steps which led to war in Iraq.
President Bush argued that, “The lesson of 9/11 was that if we waited for a danger to fully materialize, we would have waited too long.”[1] He believed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and would not hesitate either to use them or to give them to terrorists who might employ them against the U. S. or its allies. The President felt he could not take this chance. He decided, “We would confront the threat from Iraq, one way or another.”[2]
The United States pushed Saddam to give up his WMD program and to allow United Nations inspections. Saddam failed to comply with U. N. resolutions and U. S. demands. The only reasonable conclusion was that Saddam had WMDs and discounted the likelihood the U. S. would go to war. Saddam miscalculated. In mid-March 2003, U. S. forces and their coalition allies invaded Iraq.
Any decision to launch a preemptive war must be founded on solid intelligence. President Bush believed the intelligence reports that Saddam had WMDs, but they turned out to be incorrect. Saddam had destroyed his stocks of WMDs, but did not want to admit this publicly. Saddam could have avoided a U. S. invasion by providing evidence he had no WMDs and allowing international inspectors. In the end, Saddam was more concerned about Iran and how it would react to an admission he had no WMDs than he was of a U. S. invasion of Iraq which he believed would not occur.
Saddam was wrong. He was deposed, captured, tried, and executed. U. S. forces in Iraq proved insufficient to occupy the country and maintain control. Iraq split along sectarian lines and descended into violence as long-suppressed grievances came to the surface. An insurgency began as terrorists flooded into Iraq to fight U. S. forces in this new front in the War on Terror.
President Bush is candid in his assessment of the intelligence failure which led to war in Iraq. “In retrospect, of course, we all should have pushed harder on the intelligence and revisited our assumptions. But at the time, the evidence and the logic pointed in the other direction. If Saddam doesn’t actually have WMD, I asked myself, why on earth would he subject himself to a war he will almost certainly lose?”[3] Mr. Bush also refuted the charge that the intelligence had been manipulated to justify the war, “Nobody was lying. We were all wrong. The absence of WMD stockpiles did not change the fact that Saddam was a threat.”[4] The President also admitted there was a cost to pay, “the reality was that I had sent American troops into combat based in large part on intelligence that proved false. That was a massive blow to our credibility — my credibility — that would shake the confidence of the American people.”[5] President Bush would struggle to regain the trust of some Americans (and international partners) throughout the remainder of his time in office.
My feelings on the Iraq war are complex. I did not miss my opportunity to serve in Iraq as I had initially feared; the war went on far longer than any of us expected. I am proud to have served in Iraq (and throughout my career) with so many great Americans. I am sorry for those who lost loved ones in Afghanistan or Iraq as well as for those who live with injuries (visible or not) they sustained overseas. But I also feel deep sympathy for President Bush. I believe he ordered the invasion of Iraq in good conscience; I know he did not take the decision lightly. I am sorry for the burden he carries, but I hope it is eased — even if only a little — because he shared his story with us.
- If you are interested in purchasing President Bush’s book, Decision Points, please use this link: https://amzn.to/43jcs52
Lead Trace is an Amazon Associate and may earn a commission on qualifying purchases.
[1] George W. Bush, Decision Points, Kindle edition (Crown, 2010), 229.
[2] Bush, 229.
[3] Bush, 242.
[4] Bush, 262.
[5] Bush, 262.
Marine Corps Culture
In Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, James Q. Wilson writes, “Every culture has a blind spot, and so every organization pays some price for its culture.”[1] This caused me to ask, “What price does the U. S. military pay for its culture and did it exact a price in Afghanistan and Iraq?” This is a topic I have considered a great deal over the years. While I have not come to any firm conclusions, I will offer some thoughts which may be useful for further consideration. I believe the military culture in the U. S. Marine Corps complicated our efforts during the War on Terror.[2]
Organizational culture is important. Everyone has heard the widely-quoted (and accurate) aphorism that “culture eats strategy for breakfast.” Wilson suggests that even organizations with “good” cultures are likely to struggle in some areas. An organization will have great difficulty achieving goals which are at odds with its culture.
Could this have happened in Afghanistan and Iraq? The U. S. military — and Marine Corps in particular — fosters a strong warrior culture. One often hears Marines describe their job (only partially in jest) as killing people and breaking things. Marines focus most of their training on closing with and destroying the enemy.
Combat-focused training has several important results. Such training is designed to prepare Marines for battle by helping them develop a menu of responses from which to select in a tactical situation. Combat training also subtly biases the way Marines perceive themselves and their role in a contingency. Developing programmed responses and reinforcing the warrior ethos can be critical and will reinforce (and are reinforced by) the Marines’ military culture. This makes Marines ideal for storming a defended beach in the South Pacific or attacking Iraqi entrenchments to eject them from Kuwait.
The picture becomes murkier when this culture must grapple with more diverse challenges for which it may be poorly prepared, such as those of Afghanistan and Iraq. After the initial fighting ended in Afghanistan and Iraq, occupation and nation-building began. Marines needed to conduct a range of tasks to help the local people while simultaneously dealing with insurgents hiding amongst the population. In most cases, the Marines did this very well — despite how little training or preparation they had received for such roles.
Despite some notable successes, kinetic operations remained the focus. During a 2008 speech, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told his audience, “In the long-term effort against terrorist networks and other extremists, we know that direct military force will continue to have a role. But we also understand that over the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. Where possible, kinetic operations should be subordinate to measures to promote better governance, economic programs to spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented from which the terrorists recruit.”[3] After almost 7 years of war in Afghanistan and more than 5 years in Iraq, Secretary Gates believed the military was still off track and needed to adjust.
The U. S. military culture was part of the problem. To address Secretary Gates’s concerns, a culture shift was necessary. But changing organizational culture is extremely difficult. In his book, The Culture of War, Martin Van Creveld wrote that, “culture, rooted as it is in human psychology, is largely impervious to change.”[4] It should come as no surprise that the U. S. military struggled to change during the war — despite guidance from the Secretary of Defense.
A strong and vital military culture is a critical component of combat-ready unit. But as James Wilson reminds us, culture comes at a cost. As just one example, units which are “effective” in one situation may be less effective in another. Perhaps equally important, changing organizational culture is tough (and may be easier to break than to fix). Did U. S. military culture affect the outcome in Afghanistan and Iraq and, if so, to what degree? It is a question worth asking.
- If you are interested in purchasing James Q. Wilson’s Bureaucracy, please use this Amazon link: https://amzn.to/4kMQMVe
- If you are interested in Martin Van Creveld’s The Culture of War, please use this link: https://amzn.to/3ZsoCWN
Lead Trace is an Amazon Associate and may earn a commission on qualifying purchases.
[1] James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, Kindle edition (Basic Books, 2019), 102.
[2] This may also apply to the U. S. Army.
[3] Dan Dupont, Inside Defense, “Gates’ Speech” 30 September 2008, https://insidedefense.com/insider/gates-speech. Accessed 4 June 2025.
[4] Martin Van Creveld, The Culture of War (New York: Ballantine Books, 2008), 413.
Drones and the Dialectics of War
On June 1, Ukraine conducted a bold drone attack on Russian strategic bombers deep inside Russian territory. By necessity, Ukraine has been innovative in their development and use of drones throughout the conflict with Russia. Ukraine has used drones to conduct tactical reconnaissance and attacks, but Ukraine has also used drones for strategic strikes against Moscow, the Kerch bridge, in addition to the 1 June attack.
Militaries around the world are scrambling to try to develop effective (and cost effective) ways to neutralize enemy drones. A decade or so from now, we may look back on this as the golden age of offensive drone use. Attacking drones still have an advantage. They are cheap and can be mass produced allowing the attacker to attempt to overwhelm the defense. And that is if any real countermeasures exist and can be fielded in the numbers required to provide protection — a task complicated by the increased dispersion required to make troops (and other targets) harder to detect or destroy. Without a truly effective technological solution, the Russians seem to have relied on changes to their tactics to minimize the effectiveness of Ukrainian tactical drone strikes.[1]
This situation seems similar to the development of aircraft during World War I. When the war began, the belligerents had a relatively small number of aircraft which were generally used for reconnaissance. It did not take long for the combatants to realize that aircraft could be useful for a wide range of tasks to include bombing enemy troops and shooting down other aircraft. The number and sophistication of aircraft increased rapidly. By the time World War I ended, the Allies were conducting attacks with thousands of aircraft. Postwar theorists such as Guilio Douhet, carried away by the belief that “the bomber will always get through” asserted that ground forces would be irrelevant in the future.
World War II demonstrated that military aviation could make important contributions, but bombing alone could not bring an opponent to their knees. The Allies subjected Nazi Germany to an intensive strategic bombing campaign throughout the war. The Germans adjusted by improving their defenses (anti-aircraft guns, fighters, etc.) and moving production facilities underground. Despite the Allied air campaign, German production of war materiel increased until 1945. The Germans found ways to protect key targets and limit the impact of Allied airpower.
This dialectical interplay of forces — action and reaction — is an integral part of the nature of war. As one side gains an advantage, their opponent will seek to neutralize it. As this process plays out over time, it leads to changes in technology, techniques, and tactics. In Ukraine, dialectical forces are driving changes in drone warfare (and defense against drones) and we can watch it in real time. The Ukrainian attacks seem to indicate the offense currently has the upper hand. This is unlikely to last.
History and the dialectical nature of war would suggest that a variety of counter-drone technologies and techniques are probably not far off. The pendulum will swing back toward balance between drones and available counters unless something disturbs this equilibrium (which is also possible). After World War I, every military power had a strong air force. In a similar fashion, drones are here to stay and no modern military is likely to go to war in the future without them — or an effective counter to the enemy’s drones.
The best overview of the effectiveness and employment of military air power is Martin Van Creveld’s The Age of Airpower. If you are interested in purchasing The Age of Airpower, please use this Amazon link: https://amzn.to/4kTMXgh
Lead Trace is an Amazon Associate and may earn a commission on qualifying purchases.
A Tale of Two Fronts
For most, thoughts of World War I conjure images of trenches, massive bombardments, and battles lasting weeks or months with gains measured in yards. While this may accurately reflect reality on the Western Front for much of the war, it does not represent the German reality on the Eastern Front. In A Tale of Two Fronts: A German Soldier’s Journey Through World War I, Hans Schiller captured his experiences on the Eastern and Western Front from a front-line soldier’s perspective.
When thinking of World War I most Americans envision the Western Front with its trenches and heavy casualties. The Allies sought to use their greater industrial and manpower resources to gain victory. This often took the form of deluging German positions with ever-larger (and longer) artillery bombardments. Since the Allies won the war, some believe this method was effective. What is less apparent is that Allied victory owed a great deal to the United States entry into the war on the Allied side. When the United States declared War on Germany in early 1917, the French and British armies had been bled white. The French army had even mutinied to protest the wasteful assaults. Without the United States’ assistance, the war likely would have ended in a negotiated peace — or in a German victory.
French and British generals believed the war’s great lesson was that carefully synchronized firepower was the decisive element in modern war. The Maginot Line naturally followed. The Germans interpreted their World War I experiences far differently than the French or the British. To the Germans, fires were meant not to destroy the enemy, but to suppress them so that troops could maneuver to positions of advantage. When put to the test, the German army dispatched the French and British in slightly more than a month (although the battle was really won in the first 10 days).
What did the Germans know which the French and British did not? While there are many possible answers to this question, an important factor is that the German experience encompassed not just the Western Front, but also the far different conditions on the Eastern Front. The geographical dimensions in the East made it impossible to create a continuous line of trenches. Almost any position could be flanked. During a mid-1915 German offensive in the Baltics (a time when the Western Front was virtually immobile), Schiller described this war of maneuver, “We only knew that we battled and marched and then battled and marched all over again. We drove through burning villages but didn’t see them, we drove over corpses and didn’t give them any notice, we slept while walking and didn’t even know it. Every feeling within space and time was forgotten.”[1] The Eastern Front certainly saw periods of limited activity when the combatants waited for better weather, reinforcements, etc., but not because maneuver was impossible.
Schiller served on the Eastern Front from 1915 to early 1918. Then he was transferred to the Western Front and participated in several major German offensives. Schiller was surprised at the newly drafted German soldiers he saw in the West. “I stopped a number of them and asked their ages. Eighteen years. I asked if they had been drafted or volunteered and received this answer: ‘We were called to duty and were inducted as soldiers even though some of us have disabilities. Now they are taking everything, sir, because these days there isn’t a person in Germany who would volunteer.’”[2] This must have come as a shock to Schiller. How could Germany prevail against the Allies’ superiority with undernourished young men in the ranks? To judge by Schiller’s reminiscences, the scale of destruction he witnessed on the Western Front seems to have been far greater that which he had seen in the East. During one assault, Schiller described, “Mounds of the dead and wounded lay about us.” He also wrote, “Pieces of protective armor, pulverized positions, torn-up axles, metal and iron tossed about, shattered oak planks, holes as deep as houses torn up by the tusks of our shells, into which man after man was pressed, jumbled together among rocks, wood, and earth.”[3]
Schiller was an enlisted artilleryman during much of his time in the army but became a junior officer very late in the war. His reminiscences are not those of a senior officer with descriptions of strategic decisions. Schiller’s view of the war is from the gun position or the trenches, not from the army headquarters.
Schiller’s war memoirs are divided roughly into three parts: the first half of the book describes his background, how he joined the German Army, and his Eastern Front experiences. The next quarter of the book covers Schiller’s Western Front remembrances. The book’s last quarter is about Schiller’s time in the Freikorps.
Schiller joined the Freikorps after the November 1918 armistice and served in the Baltic States until he was demobilized in 1920. Schiller’s motivation for joining the Freikorps was not ideologically motivated. His decision was made for practical reasons. The war had interrupted his education and he had no other skills. As he wrote, “What else was I supposed to do, anyway? I hadn’t learned anything, and the art of war was really the only thing that I had a lot of experience with. Therefore, I was very happy with my decision!”[4]
Schiller’s book is a unique contribution to our knowledge of World War I. Most Western readers know very little about the German war on the Eastern Front. Histories of the war usually focus on the Western Front. Schiller offers an opportunity to learn more about German soldiers’ experiences in the East. This may provide a clue as to how German leaders understood the totality of their World War I experiences. The ultimate result in World War II was the German Blitzkrieg which rolled over the French and British who were still stuck in the mud of World War I’s Western Front.
[1] Hans Schiller, A Tale of Two Fronts: A German Soldier’s Journey Through World War I, ed. Frederic Krome and Gregory Loving, trans. Karin Wagner (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2024), 63.
[2] Schiller, 121.
[3] Schiller, 140.
[4] Schiller, 157.
Lead Trace is an Amazon Associate and may earn a commission on qualifying purchases. If you are interested in purchasing A Tale of Two Fronts, please use this Amazon link: https://amzn.to/3FDdCiv
National Museum of the Mighty Eighth Air Force
Last year, I traveled to Savannah and had the opportunity to visit several museums and historical sites, one of which was the National Museum of the Mighty Eighth Air Force. It is not widely known that the Eighth Air Force began its existence in Savannah, so it is fitting that the Eighth Air Force Museum makes its home in Savannah. For anyone interested in World War II or aviation history, the National Museum of the Mighty Eighth Air Force is certainly worth a visit.
The Eighth Air Force deserves its place in history. Just getting planes from the United States to Great Britain was an extraordinary feat. In 1942, when the Eighth Air Force pilots flew their machines to the British Isles, transatlantic flights were not yet routine. Charles Lindberg made the first solo nonstop flight from New York to Paris in 1927 - little more than a decade before World War II began in Europe. Although many planes crashed in Greenland en route, the Eighth Air Force slowly built its strength and prepared to take the war to the Third Reich.
The Eighth Air Force was organized and equipped to conduct a strategic bombing campaign against Germany. The concept of strategic bombing had its roots in the theories of an Italian, Guilio Douhet. In his 1921 book, The Command of the Air, Douhet theorized that airpower could make ground forces obsolete by flying over them and taking the war directly to the enemy’s civilian population. Considering World War I’s bloody and indecisive struggle on the Western Front, the airmen of other nations drew conclusions similar to Douhet’s and drew inspiration from his book.
The Eighth Air Forces’ strategic bombing campaign against Germany was neither bloodless nor decisive. During World War II, the Eighth Air Force lost approximately 26,000 airmen killed with another 28,000 captured. These casualties were incurred while conducting daylight “precision” bombing raids over Germany which targeted German war industries. It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of these strikes. While the army could point to territory seized or battles won, the Eighth Air Force had only an imperfect estimate of the effect it was having on the German economy.
The effect of strategic bombing on German production is open to question. Germany actually produced more tanks, aircraft, and other weapons each year from 1942-1944 despite heavy bombing from both the Eighth Air Force and the Royal Air Force. There is less debate about the effect strategic bombing had on German railroads and petroleum storage or production facilities. These last were systematically targeted and had a debilitating effect on the German war machine. The U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report claimed, “The attack on transportation … completely disorganized the German economy. It reduced war production in all categories and made it difficult to move what was produced to the front. The attack also limited the tactical mobility of the German Army.”[1] This is significant.
While the museum’s displays focus on World War II, there are also displays dedicated to modern conflicts in which the Eighth Air Force has played a role. The National Museum of the Mighty Eighth Air Force is a fitting tribute to the valor and sacrifice of those who served in the Eighth Air Force throughout its history.
To plan your visit to the National Museum of the Mighty Eighth Air Force, visit their site at: https://www.mightyeighth.org
To learn more about the Eighth Air Force during World War II, we recommend Donald L. Miller’s Masters of the Air: America’s Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany. To purchase this book, please use the following link: https://amzn.to/4mwh9zL
Lead Trace is an Amazon Associate and may earn a commission on qualifying purchases.
[1] United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (1945; reprint, Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1987), 30.
The Siege of Khe Sanh
I first became interested in the Vietnam War in the mid-1980s. I was at a historical board game convention and purchased Victory Games’ Vietnam: 1965-1975.[1] As I read the rules and the accompanying designer’s notes, I realized I knew next to nothing about the Vietnam War. In history class, we had run out of time at the end of the year and never discussed Vietnam. I wanted to know more.
I went to the library, checked out some books and started to read. I probably became interested in Khe Sanh because it was one of the war’s few major battles. I still thought about war in terms of battles, front lines, control of terrain, and casualties, so Khe Sanh offered something I could comprehend.
Among the small selection of Vietnam books the library offered was Robert Pisor’s The End of the Line (published in 1982). I enjoyed this book and have never forgotten it. I have learned a lot about Vietnam in the years since I first read it and decided to re-read Pisor’s book (re-published as The Siege of Khe Sanh. My earlier impressions of the book were confirmed; it is a well-written and readable account of the battle. I was pleasantly surprised to find the book has stood up remarkably well in the more than 40 years since its publication.
Marines occupied Khe Sanh in force during 1967 at the behest of General Willliam C. Westmoreland, U. S. Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), senior U. S. general in Vietnam. Westmoreland believed troops at Khe Sanh would help interdict North Vietnamese infiltration along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in neighboring Laos. Senior Marine leaders wished to focus on protecting and pacifying population centers along the coast rather than being drawn into the mountainous highlands, but Westmoreland insisted. The Marines accepted the mission despite their reservations.
Both Westmoreland and the Marines were concerned about Khe Sanh’s isolation which invited comparisons to Dien Bien Phu. In 1954, under the leadership of Vo Nguyen Giap, the Viet Minh (forerunner of the NVA) had defeated a French army which had parachuted into Dien Bien Phu and established defensive positions deep inside Viet Minh territory. The French wished to draw the Viet Minh into attacking entrenched French forces. Unfortunately for the French, the Viet Minh obliged them by attacking one French fort after another — but only after blasting it with artillery laboriously moved into position in the nearby mountains (a feat the French believed impossible). Westmoreland was aware of the apparent similarities between Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh, but he was confident aerial resupply and massive American firepower nullified any comparison.
Westmoreland’s Vietnam strategy was to kill North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) soldiers faster than they could be replaced. Once this “crossover point” had been reached, North Vietnamese leaders would realize the struggle was unsustainable and sue for peace. Westmoreland had to bait a trap and entice the NVA into the meat grinder. Westmoreland would dangle Khe Sanh before the NVA to entice them into a battle where he could inflict massive casualties on the North Vietnamese forces.
As 1967 went on, NVA activity around Khe Sanh increased. In mid-April, a series of bloody battles occurred on the hills around Khe Sahn. After the “Hill Fights,” NVA interest in Khe Sanh seemed to wane until late 1967, when NVA troops returned in force. Based on this intelligence, more Marines were sent to Khe Sanh.
In the early morning of 21 January 1968, the NVA attacked. This assault marked the beginning of the siege of Khe Sanh. Route 9, the highway resupply route from Khe Sanh to Marine positions along the coast was cut off and supplies could only arrive at Khe Sahn by air.
U. S. intelligence picked up information pointing to attacks on South Vietnam’s cities, but Westmoreland downplayed it. As the Tet holiday neared, Westmoreland continued to believe the real threat was to Khe Sanh. Pisor’s assessment was that Westmoreland had erred and that “it was clearly Khe Sanh and I Corps [the northern provinces of South Vietnam] that faced the greatest threat. It was possible, of course, that Giap was planning something more ambitious, but Westmoreland was now certain that Giap wanted Khe Sanh.”[2]
Sir Max Hastings agreed with Pisor’s assessment that Westmoreland was too focused on Khe Sanh. In his 2018 examination of the Vietnam wars from 1945-1975, Hastings wrote, “Westmoreland endowed Khe Sanh with an importance that it did not deserve; like Dienbienphu, the place should probably never have been garrisoned. Worse, he allowed the world to see where his gaze was fixed, which made him appear foolish - indeed, helped to destroy his reputation - when the enemy struck elsewhere.”[3]
Westmoreland was caught off guard by the Tet Offensive. After the NVA and VC offensive had spent its force, he lauded the Tet Offensive as a great victory for U. S. and South Vietnamese forces. In a narrow military sense, this was true. The VC had suffered crippling losses. But the Tet Offensive came as a shock to Americans. Given Westmoreland’s recent optimistic pronouncements about Vietnam, how were the NVA and VC able to pull off a surprise attack in such force? The Tet Offensive burned out, but Americans began to reconsider their involvement in Vietnam. Meanwhile, the siege of Khe Sanh ground on for several more weeks until one day, rather than assault the base, the NVA simply slipped away.
Did the NVA ever intend to seize Khe Sanh or was it simply a feint to draw Westmoreland’s attention and troops away from the population centers – the Tet Offensive’s real objectives? For his part, Pisor believed the NVA used Khe Sanh to deceive Westmoreland and had succeeded admirably. Hastings disagreed, writing “it seems mistaken to imagine that the North Vietnamese deployed two divisions solely as a deception. It is overwhelmingly likely that they would have attempted its capture if American artillery and, above all, air power had not made this impossible. Communist officers later lamented the fact that the two formations had not instead been committed farther east, preferably at Hue.”[4]
The Siege of Khe Sanh is still an excellent overview of this controversial battle. Pisor’s prose is clear and direct, and the result is a book which is easy to read. It is not the final word on Khe Sanh (we are unlikely to have any such account until the Democratic Republic of Vietnam opens its archives — if even then), but the book is a very good place to start.
Lead Trace is an Amazon Associate and may earn a commission on qualifying purchases.
- If you are interested in Robert Pisor’s book, please use this link: https://amzn.to/4kvRx4a
- If you are interested in Max Hastings’s book, please use this link: https://amzn.to/3ZsSja6
- If you are interested in GMT’s Vietnam, please use this link: https://amzn.to/3FmA8w2
[1] GMT Games recently released a reprint of this game with updated art and graphics. I cannot recommend this game highly enough for anyone interested in wargaming the Vietnam War.
[2] Robert Pisor, Siege of Khe Sanh: The Story of the Vietnam War’s Largest Battle (W. W. Norton & Company, 2018), 145. Kindle edition.
[3] Max Hastings, Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy, 1945 – 1975 (HarperCollins, 2018), 442. Kindle edition.
[4] Hastings, 442.
The Virginia Campaign of ‘64 and ‘65
The campaign between Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee from 1864-1864 may be the Civil War’s most fascinating period. It features the preeminent Union and Confederate generals facing off in a struggle which will decide the war’s outcome. The campaign is set against the political background of the 1864 U. S. presidential election which gave even greater weight to events on the battlefield. General Andrew A. Humphreys, Chief of Staff for the Army of the Potomac (and later Commander of the II Corps) wrote a first-hand account which is essential reading for anyone interested in the long campaign to defeat Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, capture Richmond, and destroy the Confederacy.
In The Virginia Campaign: 1864-65, Humphreys described the Eastern Theater’s final campaign from Grant’s appointment as the U. S. Army’s General-in-Chief to Appomattox. Given Humphreys’ intimate involvement with many of the events he describes (even though the book was written almost 20 years later), one would expect this to be an important book. And it is — sort of.
Humphreys sets out events in a relatively impartial manner. The Virginia Campaign allows the reader to understand how all the disparate elements of Grant’s strategy interacted. Humphreys relates the operations against Lee’s army, Benjamin Butler’s movements against Richmond and Petersburg, as well as Union efforts in the Shenandoah Valley.
Humphreys could spend a great deal of time rationalizing each decision and explaining why events did not occur as Grant and Meade had planned and he (Humphreys) had ordered. He does none of this. Humphreys’ account comes across as detached. Options which must have been hotly debated at the time are briefly discussed and the decisions put forth in a cut-and-dried manner. If there were proponents for the discarded options, they are not identified, and the historical record is thereby diminished.
One of the rare instances when Humphreys’ connection comes through is when he briefly mentions Meade’s difficulties working under Grant. The relationship between Grant and Meade was tested almost as soon as the campaign began and Meade commented on it in letters to his wife.[1] Humphreys made only a single tantalizing comment about this. In describing the fighting at Spotsylvania, Humphreys wrote, “There were two officers commanding the same army. Such a mixed command was not calculated to produce the best results that either singly was capable of bringing about. It naturally caused some vagueness and uncertainty as to the exact sphere of each, and-sometimes took away from the positiveness, fullness, and earnestness of the consideration of an intended operation or tactical movement that, had there been but one commander, would have had the most earnest attention and corresponding action.”[2] Meade’s frustration with the dual command system grew as the campaign progressed. Doubtless, Humphreys could have shed far more light on the friction between Meade, Grant, and their staffs had he chosen to do so. Unfortunately, the lonely comment above is all Humphreys divulged.
This is the book’s pattern. For all Humphreys revealed about the campaign, there seems to be an equal or greater amount which he omits. It is not the book’s only remarkable characteristic.
There is little or no analysis of events. Decisions are briefly outlined, and possible options are quickly examined and as quickly discarded. Humphreys described events but offers little analysis. Humphreys seems not to have had second thoughts about any of the decisions made during the campaign. The book feels like a missed opportunity to examine the campaign in retrospect.
When it comes to controversial events, Humphreys seems to have decided to say as little as possible. Where he felt comments were unavoidable, he allowed the opinions of others to stand in for his own. For instance, Humphreys expressed no thoughts on the debacle at The Crater on 30 July 1864; he only paraphrased Grant’s testimony to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War blaming Burnside and the division commanders involved (Ledlie and Ferrero).[3] Similarly, in relating Sheridan’s relief of Governeur K. Warren at Five Forks, Humphreys neither condemns nor affirms Sheridan’s course; he simply quotes from the Court of Inquiry report.[4]
Humphreys is silent not just on controversial issues, but also on key events throughout the campaign:
- Wilderness. Cavalry failures on 4-5 May 1864 which allowed the Army of Northern Virginia to approach the Army of the Potomac without adequate warning.
- Spotsylvania. What prevented the 12 May 1864 assault on the Mule Shoe from being a decisive stroke?
- Cold Harbor. What was Meade’s view of the 3 June 1864 assault before it occurred? Meade’s views from the Army of the Potomac’s headquarters on Grant’s orders during the campaign would have been interesting, but Humphreys never provides any comments on this.
- Petersburg. What prevented the capture of Petersburg on 16-18 June 1864?
- Why was there a delay in transferring the Sixth Corps to Washington, D. C., as Jubal Early’s forces moved down the Shenandoah Valley and into Maryland?
This is only a partial list. It is one of the unfortunate deficiencies of Humphreys’ account that he fails to address questions still of interest to historians. For all its flaws and missed opportunities,The Virginia Campaignis still an important book, if only because it is written by one of the campaign’s central participants.
[1] George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913). In particular, see letters dated 19 May 1864, 23 May 1864, 1 June 1864, 4 June 1864, and 5 June 1864 (2: 197, 198, 200, 201).
[2] Andrew A. Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of ’64 and ’65, vol. 12, Campaigns of the Civil War (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1883), 83.
[3] Humphreys, 12:264.
[4] Humphreys, 12:358–62.
If you are interested in this book, please use the following link to Amazon: https://amzn.to/45j3BkV. Lead Trace is an Amazon Associate and may earn a commission on qualifying purchases.
The Good Shepherd: A Novel
It all begins with an idea.
Forester is well-known for his Horatio Hornblower novels, but he wrote several other works of fiction which are of value to anyone interested in the military. Forester’s novels provide insight into how the leader in the story thinks through the problem he is facing. This is one of Forester’s strengths as a storyteller and it makes The Good Shepherd a valuable book.
The Good Shepherd is a set during World War II. Commander Krause, captain of the destroyer USS Keeling is providing escort duty for a convoy of more than 30 ships in the North Atlantic from the United States to Great Britain in late 1942. Convoy duty during this period of the war was extremely hazardous. Krause’s convoy is attacked by a wolfpack of German submarines and must do their best to fight them off and protect the merchant ships they are escorting.
Krause’s task is further complicated because he is the senior captain among four destroyer escorts (a pitiably small number to provide security to so many ships). This is his first combat mission while his subordinates of the British Royal Navy (and one Polish Navy ship) already have more than two years’ experience. Krause must lead the sailors on the Keeling and he must gain the confidence of his allies while facing a resourceful and relentless enemy.
Forester is at his best when allowing readers to enter the mind of the protagonist. This allows the reader to think through the situation along with the character. As just one example, Krause is forced to decide whether to reverse course to aid a merchant ship which has been torpedoed by a German submarine.
“There were powerful arguments against turning back. Night would be falling before he reached there. He would be astern of the convoy again, with all the prolonged delay before he could rejoin it, especially if the convoy were to get into serious disorder. Whatever mischief a U-boat might do had by now been already done; he could not remedy that. Nor could he hope to avenge it with his small remainder of depth charges. He might pick up survivors—but Cadena and Viktor were on the spot and he would not be there for half an hour. But what would the men on board the convoy think of him if they saw him placidly steaming along ahead of them while their comrades died astern? He went to the T.B.S. [Talk Between Ships – an inter-ship radio system] Dodge and James answered promptly enough; they were aware of trouble in the convoy and asked for orders; he could only tell them to stay on station. But he could not raise Viktor on the circuit at all. He said “George to Eagle. George to Eagle. Do you hear me?” and received no reply. Viktor was ten miles away—possibly more by now—and it was quite possible that she could not hear. It was faintly possible that her hands were so full she had no time to reply, but it was hardly likely. Krause stood holding the handset yearning inexpressibly to hear one single word even from that nonchalant English voice. The commodore was blinking away, his light directed straight at Keeling; it must be a message for him. And it must be urgent, for it was almost too dark for Morse messages to be safe.”
This is classic Forester. Krause clearly lays out the problem and evaluates the information he possesses before deciding. This technique allows the reader to form their own opinion in parallel and compare their decision to that in the story.
Decisions like this are sprinkled liberally throughout the book. This makes The Good Shepherd — and most of Forester’s books — valuable to anyone interested in improving their decision-making ability. This technique also imparts a deeper appreciation for the difficulties faced by convoy commanders in the North Atlantic during World War II. The Good Shepherd is the basis for the recent movie, Greyhound, with Tom Hanks which also attempts to capture the stresses faced by a wartime convoy escort commander. Both the book and the movie are worth the time investment.
If you are interested in this book, please use the following link to Amazon: https://amzn.to/4meCk9o . Lead Trace is an Amazon Associate and may earn a commission on qualifying purchases.
The Rhodesian War
It all begins with an idea.
The Rhodesian War: A Military History, Paul L. Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, 1982; reprint, 2008.
I had heard of the Rhodesian War, but I knew very little about it. I thought it was time to address my ignorance. After a short search, I selected The Rhodesian War: A Military History, by Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin. It seemed to be a good fit because I really wanted to learn about the military aspects of the war. It turned out to be an excellent introduction to the Rhodesian conflict.
The Rhodesian War really started when Rhodesia left the British Commonwealth after a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) I late 1865. Like many African colonial possessions, Rhodesia’s majority black population was ruled by a small white minority. British policy was to allow its African colonies independence with majority rule. In Rhodesia, majority rule would mean a loss of power for the Rhodesian whites, so Rhodesian leaders issued the UDI and exited the Commonwealth.
This was a clear signal to Rhodesia’s black population that representative government was not in the cards and a low-level insurgency began. At first, the number of insurgents (and incidents) was small and the Rhodesian government treated the insurgency as a criminal matter to be handled by the police. As the insurgency continued (and eventually expanded) this proved insufficient and the Rhodesian military was committed to the struggle.
Rhodesia received assistance from South Africa (another apartheid government) while a variety of insurgent groups received support (tacit or overt) from Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, and Angola. To strike at insurgents in these ostensibly safe areas, Rhodesia escalated the war by conducting cross-border raids. The war continued until late 1979, but a political settlement was reached in early 1980 which allowed Rhodesia’s black population full representation in Rhodesia.
Much like the U. S. effort in Vietnam, “The armed forces of Rhodesia won virtually every battle and skirmish they ever fought against the guerrilla armies, yet they lost the war.”[1] Wedded to the strategic goal of maintaining minority white rule until the end of the war, the Rhodesian government had little chance of winning over most black Rhodesians. Rhodesian “strategic ineptitude”[2] doomed the war from the start, despite repeated tactical successes. As the military theorist, Bill Lind, is fond of pointing out, a higher level of war trumps a lower level of war. Strategic failure is a sure-fire way to lose a war — no matter how superior one may be at the tactical or operational levels.
The Rhodesians seemed to focus on the tactical military aspects of the war rather than addressing the political causes which motivated the insurgents. This led to a situation in which victory actually receded with each tactical victory.
“Rhodesians might point proudly to their consistent tactical successes and the ever-mounting body counts, but they failed to realize that the guerrillas were waging a successful protracted war. It was futile to conjecture that in a straight fight the Rhodesians could annihilate the entire guerrilla armies, and to rail against the refusal of guerrillas to stand and fight like men, when so little was done to undermine the massive popular support they had built up through a skilful manipulation of the poverty and the disadvantaged existence of the bulk of Africans, and through the use of selective brutality.”[3]
Although the insurgents had difficulty competing on the battlefield with Rhodesian forces, they were virtually unopposed on the ideological battlefield which determined ultimate success or failure.
“While the Rhodesians became increasingly confused in their war aims, the guerrillas had a clear vision of their purpose. Their goal was to break the back of white supremacy and establish a state based on black majority rule. This gave the guerrilla armies and their leadership remarkable stamina, and their cause the strength to weather many political crises and recurrent military defeat in the field.”[4]
As the war went on, the number of guerrillas increased. This trend should have alarmed Rhodesian leaders and called the effectiveness of their strategy into question. Instead of a fundamental reconsideration of their approach, the answer seems to have been to conscript more men to increase the size of the army and police forces and to escalate the war by ever more brazen raids into neighboring states. By the late 1970s, it was clear that escalation had failed and the only option was to negotiate the most favorable political solution possible under the circumstances.
As the title implies, the book’s focus is on the war’s military aspects. There was a good discussion of how politics influenced military action, but given how important the political dimension was to the war’s outcome and the number of players involved, devoting a little more space to this would have been helpful (or perhaps I needed to slow down and really digest this information before continuing). The Rhodesian War: A Military History is not just an excellent introduction to a little-known conflict, it is also a valuable example of a modern insurgency as well as why the counterinsurgent forces failed.
[1] Paul L. Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, The Rhodesian War: A Military History (Pen & Sword Books, 2008), 66.
[2] Ibid., 66.
[3] Ibid., 96.
[4] Ibid., 100.
If you are interested in this book, please use the following link to Amazon: https://amzn.to/3HgrzTW. Lead Trace is an Amazon Associate and may earn a commission on qualifying purchases.