Drones and the Dialectics of War
On June 1, Ukraine conducted a bold drone attack on Russian strategic bombers deep inside Russian territory. By necessity, Ukraine has been innovative in their development and use of drones throughout the conflict with Russia. Ukraine has used drones to conduct tactical reconnaissance and attacks, but Ukraine has also used drones for strategic strikes against Moscow, the Kerch bridge, in addition to the 1 June attack.
Militaries around the world are scrambling to try to develop effective (and cost effective) ways to neutralize enemy drones. A decade or so from now, we may look back on this as the golden age of offensive drone use. Attacking drones still have an advantage. They are cheap and can be mass produced allowing the attacker to attempt to overwhelm the defense. And that is if any real countermeasures exist and can be fielded in the numbers required to provide protection — a task complicated by the increased dispersion required to make troops (and other targets) harder to detect or destroy. Without a truly effective technological solution, the Russians seem to have relied on changes to their tactics to minimize the effectiveness of Ukrainian tactical drone strikes.[1]
This situation seems similar to the development of aircraft during World War I. When the war began, the belligerents had a relatively small number of aircraft which were generally used for reconnaissance. It did not take long for the combatants to realize that aircraft could be useful for a wide range of tasks to include bombing enemy troops and shooting down other aircraft. The number and sophistication of aircraft increased rapidly. By the time World War I ended, the Allies were conducting attacks with thousands of aircraft. Postwar theorists such as Guilio Douhet, carried away by the belief that “the bomber will always get through” asserted that ground forces would be irrelevant in the future.
World War II demonstrated that military aviation could make important contributions, but bombing alone could not bring an opponent to their knees. The Allies subjected Nazi Germany to an intensive strategic bombing campaign throughout the war. The Germans adjusted by improving their defenses (anti-aircraft guns, fighters, etc.) and moving production facilities underground. Despite the Allied air campaign, German production of war materiel increased until 1945. The Germans found ways to protect key targets and limit the impact of Allied airpower.
This dialectical interplay of forces — action and reaction — is an integral part of the nature of war. As one side gains an advantage, their opponent will seek to neutralize it. As this process plays out over time, it leads to changes in technology, techniques, and tactics. In Ukraine, dialectical forces are driving changes in drone warfare (and defense against drones) and we can watch it in real time. The Ukrainian attacks seem to indicate the offense currently has the upper hand. This is unlikely to last.
History and the dialectical nature of war would suggest that a variety of counter-drone technologies and techniques are probably not far off. The pendulum will swing back toward balance between drones and available counters unless something disturbs this equilibrium (which is also possible). After World War I, every military power had a strong air force. In a similar fashion, drones are here to stay and no modern military is likely to go to war in the future without them — or an effective counter to the enemy’s drones.
The best overview of the effectiveness and employment of military air power is Martin Van Creveld’s The Age of Airpower. If you are interested in purchasing The Age of Airpower, please use this Amazon link: https://amzn.to/4kTMXgh
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