The Virginia Campaign of ‘64 and ‘65
The campaign between Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee from 1864-1864 may be the Civil War’s most fascinating period. It features the preeminent Union and Confederate generals facing off in a struggle which will decide the war’s outcome. The campaign is set against the political background of the 1864 U. S. presidential election which gave even greater weight to events on the battlefield. General Andrew A. Humphreys, Chief of Staff for the Army of the Potomac (and later Commander of the II Corps) wrote a first-hand account which is essential reading for anyone interested in the long campaign to defeat Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, capture Richmond, and destroy the Confederacy.
In The Virginia Campaign: 1864-65, Humphreys described the Eastern Theater’s final campaign from Grant’s appointment as the U. S. Army’s General-in-Chief to Appomattox. Given Humphreys’ intimate involvement with many of the events he describes (even though the book was written almost 20 years later), one would expect this to be an important book. And it is — sort of.
Humphreys sets out events in a relatively impartial manner. The Virginia Campaign allows the reader to understand how all the disparate elements of Grant’s strategy interacted. Humphreys relates the operations against Lee’s army, Benjamin Butler’s movements against Richmond and Petersburg, as well as Union efforts in the Shenandoah Valley.
Humphreys could spend a great deal of time rationalizing each decision and explaining why events did not occur as Grant and Meade had planned and he (Humphreys) had ordered. He does none of this. Humphreys’ account comes across as detached. Options which must have been hotly debated at the time are briefly discussed and the decisions put forth in a cut-and-dried manner. If there were proponents for the discarded options, they are not identified, and the historical record is thereby diminished.
One of the rare instances when Humphreys’ connection comes through is when he briefly mentions Meade’s difficulties working under Grant. The relationship between Grant and Meade was tested almost as soon as the campaign began and Meade commented on it in letters to his wife.[1] Humphreys made only a single tantalizing comment about this. In describing the fighting at Spotsylvania, Humphreys wrote, “There were two officers commanding the same army. Such a mixed command was not calculated to produce the best results that either singly was capable of bringing about. It naturally caused some vagueness and uncertainty as to the exact sphere of each, and-sometimes took away from the positiveness, fullness, and earnestness of the consideration of an intended operation or tactical movement that, had there been but one commander, would have had the most earnest attention and corresponding action.”[2] Meade’s frustration with the dual command system grew as the campaign progressed. Doubtless, Humphreys could have shed far more light on the friction between Meade, Grant, and their staffs had he chosen to do so. Unfortunately, the lonely comment above is all Humphreys divulged.
This is the book’s pattern. For all Humphreys revealed about the campaign, there seems to be an equal or greater amount which he omits. It is not the book’s only remarkable characteristic.
There is little or no analysis of events. Decisions are briefly outlined, and possible options are quickly examined and as quickly discarded. Humphreys described events but offers little analysis. Humphreys seems not to have had second thoughts about any of the decisions made during the campaign. The book feels like a missed opportunity to examine the campaign in retrospect.
When it comes to controversial events, Humphreys seems to have decided to say as little as possible. Where he felt comments were unavoidable, he allowed the opinions of others to stand in for his own. For instance, Humphreys expressed no thoughts on the debacle at The Crater on 30 July 1864; he only paraphrased Grant’s testimony to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War blaming Burnside and the division commanders involved (Ledlie and Ferrero).[3] Similarly, in relating Sheridan’s relief of Governeur K. Warren at Five Forks, Humphreys neither condemns nor affirms Sheridan’s course; he simply quotes from the Court of Inquiry report.[4]
Humphreys is silent not just on controversial issues, but also on key events throughout the campaign:
- Wilderness. Cavalry failures on 4-5 May 1864 which allowed the Army of Northern Virginia to approach the Army of the Potomac without adequate warning.
- Spotsylvania. What prevented the 12 May 1864 assault on the Mule Shoe from being a decisive stroke?
- Cold Harbor. What was Meade’s view of the 3 June 1864 assault before it occurred? Meade’s views from the Army of the Potomac’s headquarters on Grant’s orders during the campaign would have been interesting, but Humphreys never provides any comments on this.
- Petersburg. What prevented the capture of Petersburg on 16-18 June 1864?
- Why was there a delay in transferring the Sixth Corps to Washington, D. C., as Jubal Early’s forces moved down the Shenandoah Valley and into Maryland?
This is only a partial list. It is one of the unfortunate deficiencies of Humphreys’ account that he fails to address questions still of interest to historians. For all its flaws and missed opportunities,The Virginia Campaignis still an important book, if only because it is written by one of the campaign’s central participants.
[1] George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913). In particular, see letters dated 19 May 1864, 23 May 1864, 1 June 1864, 4 June 1864, and 5 June 1864 (2: 197, 198, 200, 201).
[2] Andrew A. Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of ’64 and ’65, vol. 12, Campaigns of the Civil War (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1883), 83.
[3] Humphreys, 12:264.
[4] Humphreys, 12:358–62.
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