Marine Corps Culture
In Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, James Q. Wilson writes, “Every culture has a blind spot, and so every organization pays some price for its culture.”[1] This caused me to ask, “What price does the U. S. military pay for its culture and did it exact a price in Afghanistan and Iraq?” This is a topic I have considered a great deal over the years. While I have not come to any firm conclusions, I will offer some thoughts which may be useful for further consideration. I believe the military culture in the U. S. Marine Corps complicated our efforts during the War on Terror.[2]
Organizational culture is important. Everyone has heard the widely-quoted (and accurate) aphorism that “culture eats strategy for breakfast.” Wilson suggests that even organizations with “good” cultures are likely to struggle in some areas. An organization will have great difficulty achieving goals which are at odds with its culture.
Could this have happened in Afghanistan and Iraq? The U. S. military — and Marine Corps in particular — fosters a strong warrior culture. One often hears Marines describe their job (only partially in jest) as killing people and breaking things. Marines focus most of their training on closing with and destroying the enemy.
Combat-focused training has several important results. Such training is designed to prepare Marines for battle by helping them develop a menu of responses from which to select in a tactical situation. Combat training also subtly biases the way Marines perceive themselves and their role in a contingency. Developing programmed responses and reinforcing the warrior ethos can be critical and will reinforce (and are reinforced by) the Marines’ military culture. This makes Marines ideal for storming a defended beach in the South Pacific or attacking Iraqi entrenchments to eject them from Kuwait.
The picture becomes murkier when this culture must grapple with more diverse challenges for which it may be poorly prepared, such as those of Afghanistan and Iraq. After the initial fighting ended in Afghanistan and Iraq, occupation and nation-building began. Marines needed to conduct a range of tasks to help the local people while simultaneously dealing with insurgents hiding amongst the population. In most cases, the Marines did this very well — despite how little training or preparation they had received for such roles.
Despite some notable successes, kinetic operations remained the focus. During a 2008 speech, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told his audience, “In the long-term effort against terrorist networks and other extremists, we know that direct military force will continue to have a role. But we also understand that over the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. Where possible, kinetic operations should be subordinate to measures to promote better governance, economic programs to spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented from which the terrorists recruit.”[3] After almost 7 years of war in Afghanistan and more than 5 years in Iraq, Secretary Gates believed the military was still off track and needed to adjust.
The U. S. military culture was part of the problem. To address Secretary Gates’s concerns, a culture shift was necessary. But changing organizational culture is extremely difficult. In his book, The Culture of War, Martin Van Creveld wrote that, “culture, rooted as it is in human psychology, is largely impervious to change.”[4] It should come as no surprise that the U. S. military struggled to change during the war — despite guidance from the Secretary of Defense.
A strong and vital military culture is a critical component of combat-ready unit. But as James Wilson reminds us, culture comes at a cost. As just one example, units which are “effective” in one situation may be less effective in another. Perhaps equally important, changing organizational culture is tough (and may be easier to break than to fix). Did U. S. military culture affect the outcome in Afghanistan and Iraq and, if so, to what degree? It is a question worth asking.
- If you are interested in purchasing James Q. Wilson’s Bureaucracy, please use this Amazon link: https://amzn.to/4kMQMVe
- If you are interested in Martin Van Creveld’s The Culture of War, please use this link: https://amzn.to/3ZsoCWN
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[1] James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, Kindle edition (Basic Books, 2019), 102.
[2] This may also apply to the U. S. Army.
[3] Dan Dupont, Inside Defense, “Gates’ Speech” 30 September 2008, https://insidedefense.com/insider/gates-speech. Accessed 4 June 2025.
[4] Martin Van Creveld, The Culture of War (New York: Ballantine Books, 2008), 413.